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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
augmented by the recent expressions in Railway Mail Ass'n'v. Cors 18 and
Oyama v. California,'9 requiring that the constitutionality of state action be
tested according to whether the rights of an individual are restricted because
of his race. Such a construction makes it doubtful whether the "equal protection" clause would permit a statute involving a racial classification to be sustained, except under circumstances similar to those in Hirabayashiv. United
20
States.
While the decision will have no drastic repercussions on its facts, since
few will avail themselves of the opportunity to enter into miscegenous marriages, its significance lies in the fact that if this interpretation of the "equal
protection" clause be correct, the question is raised as to the future of other
types of segregation recognized to date. 2' It would seem that the door is being
opened to further application of this interpretation to public laws dealing with
the more common and consequential segregational problems. 2

CRIMINAL LAW-INDEFINITE SUSPENSION IN IMPOSITION
OF SENTENCE
Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possessing and
selling lottery tickets. On December 7, 1945, he was adjudged guilty, and
the court ordered "that the passing of sentence herein be continued from
day to day and from term to term until disposed of." Petitioner was thereupon released. Subsequently, on July 13, 1948, two years and seven months
after the imposition of sentence was suspended, he was rearrested and, six
days later, was sentenced to three years at hard labor. The court, before
passing sentence, denied a motion of the petitioner that he be allowed a
hearing to show that he did not violate any agreement or understanding'
made at the time of suspension. Held, appeal dismissed, since no conditions
were imposed at the original trial, the hearing was not required. Pinkney v.
State, 37 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1948).
Suspension of sentence cases must be closely scrutinized, for the courts
have indiscriminately used this phrase in two situations; suspension of
18. "A judicial determination that such legislation (N. Y. STATE LAOR RmATlOuS
AcT, N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWS, c. 31, Art. 20) violated the Fourteenth Amendment would be a
distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent
state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color." 326
U. S. 88, 94 (1945).

19. "There remains the question whether discrimination between citizens on the basis
of their racial descent, . . . is justifiable. Here we start with the proposition that only the
most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the
equal protection clause.. . ." 332 U. S. 633, 646 (1948)..
20. 320 U. S. 81 (1943) (exigencies of war).

21. See, e.g., McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., supra (segregation on railroad

trains) ; Missouri ex rt. Gaines v. Canada, supra (segregation in schools).

22. See note 21 supra.

CASES NOTED
imposition or pronouncement of sentence, and the suspension of execution
of sentefnce.' It appears that its proper use refers to the first interpretation,
and herein it wilt so be used.
It is submitted that the courts have used the power to suspend sentence
so promiscuously as to lose sight of its derivation and the purposes for its
origin in early English common law. The practice of suspending sentence
derived its existence from the hardships resulting from peculiar rules of
criminal procedure at a time when the court had no power to grant a new
trial, either upon the same or additional evidence, and when the verdict
was not reviewed on the facts by any higher court. 2 Blackstone stated that
the court could suspend the sentence if the judge was not satisfied with the
verdict, if the evidence was uncertain, if the indictment was not sufficient,
when favorable or extenuating circumstances appeared, or when youths
were convicted of their first offense; otherwise, the court was required to
pronounce the judgment and punishment annexed to the crime. 3 Later,
however, during the reign of Queen Mary, criminal procedure was changed
so that witnesses might testify in behalf of the accused, thus eliminating
much of the need for the suspension of sentence. Concerning suspension of
sentence in the United States, one court has said, "The courts are trying
to work out a theory to inherit power from English jurisprudence, although
it was taken away from England nearly a century ago and arose under conditions wholly at variance with our system of jurisprudence." 4
It is exceedingly difficult to reconcile the, confusion existing in the
courts today or the wide differences of opinion as to-the extent of the courts'
power to suspend the imposition of sentence. Nearly all jurisdictions recognize the power to do so temporarily, or for a reasonable time, 5 but the courts
differ in regard to their power to suspend the imposition of sentence indefinitely.6 The majority view declares that the power to suspend may be exercised
only to a limited degree while a minority view maintains that it is within the
complete discretion of the court. 7 The courts delimiting themselves have
assigned varying reasons for so doing: that the court loses jurisdiction when
the sentence is suspended and the prisoner discharged;S the suspension of
sentence operates as a condonation of the offense and is tantamount to
an exercise of the pardoning power dehors the sphere of the courts, a

1. Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509, 30 S.E. 859 (1898).
2. People ex reL. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386 (1894).
3. 4 BL. CoMm. 72.

4. In re Hart, 29 N.D. 38, 149 N.W. 568 (1914).
5. 15 Am. Jur. 134.

6. 24 C.J.S. 47.

7. See note 5 supra.

8. Smith v. State, 188 Ind. 64, 121 N.E. 829 (1919).
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prerogative of the governor ;O and that the power to do so- is not recognized
in the state.' In a case where the pronouncement of sentence was suspended
for three years, the Supreme Court of Illinois said that if a court had the
power to suspend for that length of time, it could continue indefinitely at
merely the whim of the judge, and, in effect, create an unjust situation."
Those jurisdictions holding that courts do have the power to suspend
indefinitely sentence assign diversified reasons for this result." Florida has
consistently adhered to this doctrine. In an early Florida case the defendant
was convicted of larceny, and sentenced to pay costs and attorneys' fees;
but further sentence was postponed until "the next term of court." Tit
defendant was released, and during the ensuing term of court, nothing further
was done on the case. One year later he was rearrested, and sentenced to
two years at hard labor. It was held that the court did not lose jurisdiction
of the case and it could pronounce sentence at a later date.' The court said.
"that sentence t'ay be suspended on conviction of an offender, because of
mitigating circumstances . . . is . . . held permissible." 13a The court did not
state the mitigating circumstances present which were deemed necessarily
incident to postponement or suspension. Succeeding cases, relying on this case,
have definitely established in Florida the permissibility of indefinite suspension of the imposition of sentence.' 4 It would seem from a perusal of the
cases that the mitigating circumstances which are deemed a necessary element
to such action are seldom heeded in actual practice. The Alabama court held
in an early case that the power to suspend existed,' 5 and the Massachusetts
court stated it to be a long common practice in the interest of public justice.' 6
It may be readily discerned that more than one hundred years ago, the
courts in the United States adopted a dead doctrine from England-indefinite
suspension of the imposition of sentence-and one that was never sorely
needed here. Even more so today, with well established rules of appeal and
9. United States v. Wilson, 46 Fed. 748 (C.C. Idaho 1891) ; Montgomery v. State,
231 Ala. 22 163 So. 365 (1935) (statute giving this power to the court declared invalid).
See People v. Morrissette, 20 How. Pr. 118, 119 (N.Y. 1860) ; 16 C.J. 1286.
10. Fuller v. State, 100 Miss. 811, 57 So. 806 (1921) ; Spencer v. State, 125 Tenn. 64,

140 S.W.597 (1911).

11. People ex rel. Smith v. Allen, 155 Ill. 61, 39 N.E. 568 (1895).

12. Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79. N.J. Eq. 430, 82 Atl. 424 (1912) (It may be within the
interest of public policy to stay the imposition) ; Clanton v. State, 96 Ala. 111, 11 So. 299
(1892) (".. . there has been no discontinuance of the cause .
) ; People of the State of

New York v. Roselle Graves, 31 Hun. 382 (N.Y. 1884).

13. Ex Parte Williams, 26 Fla. 310, 8 So. 425 (1890).
13a. Ex parte Williams, 26 Fla. 310, 317, 8 So. 425, 426 (1890).
14. See Ragland v. State, 55 Fla. 157, 46 So. 724 (1908) ; Carnagio v. State, 106 Fla.

209, 143 So. 162 (1932) (Judgment held incomplete until sentence pronounced) ; Bronson
v. State, 148 Fla. 188, 3 So.2d 873 (1941) (No conditions were imposed at the time of
the suspension, and therefore revocation could be had at the discretion of the court) ; Coleman v. State, 49 Fla. 447, 6 So.2d 2 (1942).
15. Charles, a Slave, v. The State, 4 Port. 107 (Ala. 1836). But see Montgomery
v. State, supra.
16. Commonwealth v, John Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133 (1874).
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procedure, parole and probation statutes,' 7 juvenile courts, and general rules
of equitable relief, suspension of sentence seems to be out-of-date. The
United States Supreme Court has said that this procedure virtually evinces
a refusal of the judiciary to perform a duty resting upon it.' s In fact, this
practice seems to be at variance with a Florida statute. 19 The state has a
right to demand and society requires that one who has been convicted of a
violation of the law or one who has entered a plea of guilty should be punished
as the law sets forth.2° If a defendant may remain under a suspension of
sentence for three years, there would seem to be nothing to prevent that
21
sentence from continuing for fifteen years.

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY IN FEDERAL COURTS OF CONFESSIONS
OBTAINED DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION
Defendant was arrested and detained beyond the time allowed prior to
being taken before a committing magistrate for the filing of a complaint against
him.' During this period of illegal detention, a confession was obtained from
defendant without the use of protracted questioning. Held, that since the confession was made during a period of illegal detention, it was inadmissible.
Upshaw v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 170 (1948).
The principal case resolves the conflict between the McNabb 2 case and
the Mitchell 3 case regarding the admissibility of confessions obtained during
an illegal detention in the absence of additional coercive factors. In the
McNabb case, federal officers arrested the defendant and detained him beyond
the time legally allowed prior to presenting him before a committing magistrate. 4 A confession obtained from him during this illegal detention was held
17. Fla. Laws 1941, c. 20519, § 1, F. S. A. 947 (parole) (1941) ; Fla. Laws 1941, e.
20519, § 35, F. S. A. 948 (probation) (1941).
18. Er parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
19. Fla. Laws,1941, c. 20519, § 20, F. S. A. 948.01-4 (1941) : "In no case shall the
imposition of sentence be suspended and the defendant thereupon placed on probation unless
such defendant be placed under the custody of said parole officer."
20. People ex rel Smith v. Allen, supra.
21. See people v. Reilly, 53 Mich. 260, 18 N.W. 849, 850 (1884) (dissenting opinion).
1. FED. R. CRIM. P., 5(a) (Requires an arresting officer to take one charged with
offenses against the laws of the United States before the nearest committing officer
without unreasonable delay).
2. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) [This case also clearly points out
that the basis of the exclusion or admission of confessions in federal courts is not any
-constitutional issue but rather the ability of the Supreme Court to establish standards
of evidence. The admissibility of allegedly coerced confessions in, state courts on appeal
to the Supreme Court, on the other hand, is always dependent upon the absence or
presence of due process. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945)].
3. Mitchell v. United Stites. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
4. The rule upon which the illegal detention in the :lfcrobb case was founded was
the predecessor of the rule involved in the instant case. See note 1 supra.

